From - Wed Jun 19 20:54:20 1996 From: cmlewan@sdv.fr (C Malte Lewan) Newsgroups: eunet.politics,talk.politics.european-union Subject: Community regionalism in Europe (half-long) Date: Mon, 17 Jun 1996 23:58:57 +0100 Message-ID: Status: RO Some of you might remember some discussion I had with Ole Villumsen (no longer on the net) about nationalism. One particular thread (initiated by him) was called "Nationalism is good" (it was a bit more nuanced than that!) where I articulated my ideas about the fabrication on which nationalism builds and my belief only in communitarian nationalism (or regionalism then). Now, one year and three weeks later I've reached another step in my ideas: The original idea is that only "communities" can have a true "nationalism"/regionalism. Here I make the two concepts nationalism and regionalism very similar because I refer to the sense of belonging to a group of people. "Communities" is a key concept to the reasoning. It's an area where a "considerable" number people mix in their daily lives. Obviously, almost any city would be a community (possibly with the exception of very big ones with several centres). Two cities can easily be a community as well if they are close to each other and there is a lot of movement in between them. I think that today, the most salient evidence of two cities belonging to the same community is an existance of commuters. So if this group is "considerable" for a certain area, we have a "community". In the region of Scania in the south of Sweden, for you who know the area, the two cities Malmö (250 000) and Lund (100 000) (with 20 km in between them) would constitute a community. Helsingborg and Ängelholm in the north of Scania (same distance in between them, 60 km away from Malmö-Lund), would be another one. So, Scania is too big to have a true nationalism, regionalism. We might eg. have four (2x2) or maybe nine (3x3) communites. The same goes for the Basque country, Slovenia, Alsace and all bigger nation states in Europe with the possible example of Luxemburg that approaches the perfect size though it's on the verge being too big. In Switzerland, as usual, we find again something approaching the perfect system with the country divided into 23 cantons (this time, on the verge of being too small (especially the half cantons)). What is deciding the size of a community is something I won't go into too much here, but you can you yourself imagine what make commuters take the trouble to travel to work everyday: not too long distances, densily populated areas with specializations in work. Even the prices of travel can set the size of the community. That means that (at least in the long term), it can be a political measure to increase or decrease the size. Let me finish with to say that in argicultural areas, people are less keen on moving, so therefore we have smaller communites. Now, nationalism. People can sense the belonging to a community. It's natural. But often, we say that we belong to a bigger group (Basques, Scanians, French...) and sometimes a smaller (Andorra...). How come? Well, first of all, creating a belonging to a national group has been a very popular way of people in power to unite an area to increase the power of this area (and in the old times almost exclusively to give themselves power as a result, less so now). And this is really the speciality of the national state. Here, this idea is driven to its final point. It's one fine fabrication, that most Europeans still believe, for example by routing for their own "national" team in the football championships, even though they come from the periphery (often border zone) of the country in question. But there are regions in Europe bigger than the communites that for some reason have succeded in surviving with a sense of belonging to a "too big" community. Again, the Basque country is a good example. Even though (or actually precisely because) the Scanian identity is clearly weaker than the Basque one (but still existing), it's my completary example. Are the identities of "Basque" and "Scanian" as much nonsense as the ones of the (to the area) bigger nation states in Europe? I'd say not. With these smaller areas where interaction between people have been at least _resembling_ the communitarian way and where the size of the region is no bigger (in a conceptual sense) than maybe the limits of the _neighboring_ community, we're not talking about the same complete (well almost) fabrication any longer. In political economics, sometimes we talk about three sorts of public goods: the facilities you use, the facilities you know are there for you to use whenever you feel like it, and finally the facilites you enjoy just because they exist (eg. you think it's important to preserve some piece of nature far far away because you are simply happy that this sort of nature exist). To transfer this thinking to regionalism, you are I) happy of living together you people who actually go places in the territory and meet people from other parts of the territory every day. Or II) you are happy about a small group of communities hanging together because you feel good about the ease you can go there and meet people from there. But the nation state ideology wants you to III) enjoy belonging to one nation with people you to a large amount never have a chance to meet on a daily basis. There is no possibility. You should just go around and feel being part of the nation, that's all. In line with the theories above, we'd allow Netherland as an acceptable political result of Type II nationalism because the territory is so limited and the movement pretty big, I'd guess. But it's harder to accept that whole territory in France where the Occitan dialects (now I a bit falsely include Provencal to make the point) is spoken as a good ground for a political territory since the constituting communities do not come in natural contact with each other (strething from western to eastern South of France). So I'm not saying that all today Europe's nation states are bad and all future territories based on minority speakers are good. Finally, it's necessary once more to stress how the sizes of communities might change. With the contruction of the TGV between Paris and Alsace, Alsace might come more into the zone of being admissible for a French (again: acceptable) Type II nationalism (depending on the price of the route). For the moment, Lund and Copenhagen don't belong to the same (Type I) community. That will probably change with the building of the bridge over the strait. Internet might build communities in the distant future (and even strangely looking non-continuous communities). But, the existence of a Type III community is an illusion. It's nothing. -- Malte Lewan Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Strasbourg, Alsace, UE cmlewan@sdv.fr cml@df.lth.se http://www.df.lth.se/~cml From - Fri Jul 5 10:55:20 1996 Message-ID: <31DCE688.4921@th.ph.ed.ac.uk> Date: Fri, 05 Jul 1996 10:55:20 +0100 From: jon ivar skullerud To: C Malte Lewan Subject: Re: Community regionalism in Europe (half-long) References: Status: RO Hej Malte! Det ser ut til at du ikke fikk noe videre respons paa dette. Kanskje det var for serioest og lite slagord-preget til aa passe inn eller skape debatt? Jeg synes dine ideer er veldig interessante, og jeg er enig med det aller meste. Jeg har bare noen faa kommentarer, for aa indikere hvordan 'Type III' samfunn kan ha en viss realitet. Det grunnleggende begrepet er *solidaritet*. Det er mulig aa ha solidaritet med folk som man aldri har moett og aldri vil ha noen sjanse til aa moete, paa grunnlag av at en er "i samme baat" eller har felles interesser. Klassesolidariteten er velkjent, men jeg vil anta at nasjonssolidariteten er like viktig. Det er den som har gjort at folk har vaert villige til aa betale skatt som folk i andre deler av landet eller andre sosiale lag har nytt godt av. Nasjonalstaten har fungert fordi denne solidariteten har eksistert, og fordi den samtidig har vaert stor nok, med tilstrekkelige ressurser til aa kunne takle de fleste viktige problemer. Problemet naa er at solidariteten er i opploesning, under angrep fra en stadig mer individualistisk kultur (spesielt paa 80-tallet). Samtidig er det vanskeligere aa forsvare nasjonalstaten paa et pragmatisk grunnlag, saa det er vanskelig aa gjenreise nasjonalsolidariteten som annet enn "jingoistic flag-waving", selv om man ansaa det som oenskelig. -- ______ ______________________________________ / | | | jon | jon ivar skullerud | \______ | | \ | jonivar@th.ph.ed.ac.uk | ivar | | http://www.ph.ed.ac.uk/~jonivar/ | _______/ |______________________________________| From cmlewan@sdv.fr Tue Aug 20 12:45 BST 1996 Message-Id: Date: Mon, 19 Aug 1996 18:26:33 +0100 To: jon ivar skullerud From: cmlewan@sdv.fr (C Malte Lewan) Subject: Re: Community regionalism in Europe Status: RO Hej Jon Ivar, At 10.55 96-07-05, jon ivar skullerud wrote: >Det ser ut til at du ikke fikk noe videre respons paa dette. >Kanskje det var for serioest og lite slagord-preget til aa >passe inn eller skape debatt? Det låter som en trevlig tolkning. :-) Ja, ditt svar är det enda jag fått. Tack! >Jeg synes dine ideer er veldig interessante, og jeg er enig med >det aller meste. Jeg har bare noen faa kommentarer, for aa >indikere hvordan 'Type III' samfunn kan ha en viss realitet. Här blev jag lite förvånad. Men så läste jag om min text och såg att jag avslutat med: "But, the existence of a Type III community is an illusion. It's nothing." >Det grunnleggende begrepet er *solidaritet*. Det er mulig aa ha >solidaritet med folk som man aldri har moett og aldri vil ha noen >sjanse til aa moete, paa grunnlag av at en er "i samme baat" eller >har felles interesser. Klassesolidariteten er velkjent, men jeg >vil anta at nasjonssolidariteten er like viktig. Det er den som >har gjort at folk har vaert villige til aa betale skatt som folk i >andre deler av landet eller andre sosiale lag har nytt godt av. >Nasjonalstaten har fungert fordi denne solidariteten har eksistert, >og fordi den samtidig har vaert stor nok, med tilstrekkelige >ressurser til aa kunne takle de fleste viktige problemer. Jag håller med om att statssolidariteten har varit bra på en hel del vis. Det har gjort effektivisering genom centralisering möjligt. Och (det du verkar tänka mer på), fattiga och sårbara mänskor och regioner har kunnat stödjas tillfälligt eller permanent. Man har kanske _lärt_ sig bry sig om andra än de närmast omkring sig. Det har också fått negativa konsekvenser, bl a en obsession med natio- nell gemenskap och utradering av lokala kulturer, språk och dia- lekter, godtyckligt gränsdragande mot "de andra", "schizofreni" i historieundervisning och en perfekt grogrund för utvecklandet av negativ nationalism och instrument för mobilisering i krig. Kanske det hade blivit lika illa eller värre med en hel del andra statliga organiseringer i Europa, men nationalstaten kan direkt kopplas till alla möjliga ofördelaktiga situationer vi haft i Europa. Kanske behövdes nationalstaten trots alla problem förknippade med den, fram till 1900-talet eller andra världskriget eller så, men dess dåliga sidor har fortfarande så dåligt inflytande och jag tror att världen (eller kanske bara Europa) idag är redo att ersätta dess goda sidor med andra strukturer. Multi-nivå federalism är det jag mest tänker på. Men den viktigaste skillnaden mellan vad jag skrev och din reply är vad jag ser att jag med "But, the existence of a Type III community is an illusion. It's nothing." menar att den inte har sin grund i folksjälen utan är konstruerad. Som jag tolkar dig så motsätter du dig inte det men påpekar att det kan vara praktiskt med Typ III. Och den är också ett utslag av humanism. Hmm, och därmed kanske orden "utbildad", "utvecklad" och "upplyst" skulle vara rättvisare ord för att uttrycka saken... :-) Kanske börjar jag förstå vad du menar... I vilket fall så behöver ju inte solidariteten bara gå i riktning andra medlemmar i Typ III-samfundet. Jag menar är att våra politiska enheter måste etableras av praktiska skäl (anpassade till de naturliga samfunden), men solidariteten är en annan sak som folk bör känna ändå oavsett etablerade Typ III-samfund. Och dagens indelning av Typ III-samfund (som jag nu tydligen börjat använda som synonym till nationalstater) är ofta inte den naturliga för människor. För folk som lever i gränszoner ter sig denna ensidiga indoktrinerade solidaritet med bara national- statens medborgare väldigt onaturlig. Världssolidaritet är en sak. Nationalitetssolidaritet är en annan. Det är den senare jag vänder mig mot i min kritik av Typ III-samfund. En annan kritik av mitt papper du gör rör orden "felles inte- resser". Ja, människor som har gemensamma intressen kan ibland bilda samfund över de geografiska samfunden i och med att de umgås och ser varandra. Fast å andra sidan har jag ju ganska hårda krav på vardaglig kontakt och lokala kulturer som resultat av alla kontakter tillsammans (+ gårdagens lokala kultur + deras interaktion etc, väldigt komplicerat). Det uppfyller sällan "the science community", "the gay community" (för att ta exempel som t o m i namnen indikerar en gemenskap) eller några andra. >Problemet naa er at solidariteten er i opploesning, under angrep >fra en stadig mer individualistisk kultur (spesielt paa 80-tallet). >Samtidig er det vanskeligere aa forsvare nasjonalstaten paa et >pragmatisk grunnlag, saa det er vanskelig aa gjenreise >nasjonalsolidariteten som annet enn "jingoistic flag-waving", >selv om man ansaa det som oenskelig. Kan du inte baka in solidariteten i det pragmatiska grundlaget? Det tycker jag du gjort ovan. Eller rättare sagt _vi_ eftersom jag erkänt dess betydelse. F ö tror jag förespråkare av national- staten kommer att få det svårt i framtiden. Just nu finns ingen debatt, det har du rätt i. Den mäktiga nationalstatsideologin sitter där den sitter medan den försvarslös beskjuts från alla håll. Nationalstaten tror ännu inte den måste försvara sig och därför verkar "debatten" överlägset vinnas av attackerarna. Jag tror nationalstaten kommer att först falla, sedan utarbeta ett ideologiskt försvar (du är före din tid, du har redan börjat), och till sist återupprätta sig själv i annan form (...för att sedan bli attackerad på nytt av ännu mer finslipade debattörer etc...). Det är så den utveckligen av ideologier brukar se ut tycker jag. ... /Malte From - Fri Sep 13 12:22:35 1996 Message-ID: <32367A2C.6231@physics.adelaide.edu.au> Date: Wed, 11 Sep 1996 18:07:00 +0930 From: jon ivar skullerud To: C Malte Lewan Subject: Re: Community regionalism in Europe References: Status: RO C Malte Lewan wrote: > Jag håller med om att statssolidariteten har varit bra på en hel > del vis. Det har gjort effektivisering genom centralisering möjligt. > Och (det du verkar tänka mer på), fattiga och sårbara mänskor och > regioner har kunnat stödjas tillfälligt eller permanent. Man har > kanske _lärt_ sig bry sig om andra än de närmast omkring sig. Ja, det var det jeg hadde i tankene. > Det > har också fått negativa konsekvenser, bl a en obsession med natio- > nell gemenskap och utradering av lokala kulturer, språk och dia- > lekter, godtyckligt gränsdragande mot "de andra", "schizofreni" i > historieundervisning och en perfekt grogrund för utvecklandet av > negativ nationalism och instrument för mobilisering i krig. Kanske > det hade blivit lika illa eller värre med en hel del andra statliga > organiseringer i Europa, men nationalstaten kan direkt kopplas > till alla möjliga ofördelaktiga situationer vi haft i Europa. I historisk sammenheng tror jeg man kan si at nasjonalstaten er den foerste sekulaere, ikke-foeydale styreformen, i moderne tid i alle fall. I saa maate er den en klar forbedring i forhold til de fyrstedoemmer, keiserriker og pavedoemmer (med deres innbyrdes avhengighet og stridigheter) som gikk forut. Nasjonalstaten tillot ogsaa et mer "transparent" demokratisk styresett enn foeydalveldet, og var muligens en historisk forutsetning for moderne demokrati. Det kan ogsaa argumenteres med at nasjonalstaten virket stabiliserende, spesielt i omraader med religioese stridigheter, i den grad man kunne erstatte lojaliteten til Gud og det religioese overhodet med lojalitet mot staten. I de tilfeller hvor nasjonen er sterkt identifisert med en bestemt religion eller konfesjon, kan det virke i motsatt retning, men det er uklart i hvor stor grad nasjonalstaten kan forsterke religioese motsetninger som allerede finnes. Den kan imidlertid brukes til aa undertrykke religioese minoriteter. > Kanske behövdes nationalstaten trots alla problem förknippade med > den, fram till 1900-talet eller andra världskriget eller så, men > dess dåliga sidor har fortfarande så dåligt inflytande och jag tror > att världen (eller kanske bara Europa) idag är redo att ersätta > dess goda sidor med andra strukturer. Multi-nivå federalism är det > jag mest tänker på. Jeg tror at nasjonalismen var for det aller meste en progressiv ide paa begynnelsen av 1800-tallet, og i mindre grad helt frem til 1. verdenskrig. Jeg tenker her paa de ideene som oppsto i den tyske romantikken, og siden paa de nasjonale bevegelsene for aa frigjoere seg fra multinasjonale imperier som Oesterrike og Tyrkia. 1. verdenskrig inneholder begge sider (baade gode og daarlige) -- krigen var bare mulig fordi man paa begge sider identifiserte seg med nasjonen, og demoniserte motparten, og den ble gjort mer grusom av at det var nasjonene (inkludert sivilbefolkningen) som var i krig, ikke bare fyrstene og deres haerer. Paa den andre siden foerte den til opploesningen av Oesterrike-Ungarn og det ottomanske imperiet, og etableringen av folkeforbundet. Alt dette var utslag av nasjonalistisk ideologi. > Kanske börjar > jag förstå vad du menar... > > I vilket fall så behöver ju inte solidariteten bara gå i riktning > andra medlemmar i Typ III-samfundet. Jag menar är att våra > politiska enheter måste etableras av praktiska skäl (anpassade > till de naturliga samfunden), men solidariteten är en annan sak > som folk bör känna ändå oavsett etablerade Typ III-samfund. Och > dagens indelning av Typ III-samfund (som jag nu tydligen börjat > använda som synonym till nationalstater) är ofta inte den > naturliga för människor. För folk som lever i gränszoner ter sig > denna ensidiga indoktrinerade solidaritet med bara national- > statens medborgare väldigt onaturlig. Det er utvilsomt sant, men det er tildels et utslag av at de nasjonalistiske prinsippene ikke har blitt fulgt ved grensedragningen... Spesielt gjelder dette der man har statsloese nasjoner, og minoriteter som har havnet paa "feil" side av grensen. I andre tilfeller er det aapenbart et utslag av at det ikke fins noen klart definert nasjon, eller at ulike nasjoner eller etniske grupper lever om hverandre. I disse tilfellene er det klart at nasjonalstats-prinsippet ikke virker. > Världssolidaritet är en > sak. Nationalitetssolidaritet är en annan. Det är den senare jag > vänder mig mot i min kritik av Typ III-samfund. Verdenssolidaritet er en fin tanke, men jeg er redd det er lenge til folk flest vil vaere i stand til aa solidarisere seg med alle mennesker i hele verden -- spesielt ettersom man beveger seg mer og mer mot et "meg foerst"-samfunn. Og en solidaritet basert paa bare Type I eller II samfunn blir for snever. Nasjonalsolidaritet blir et slags kompromiss; en solidaritet som omfatter alle sosiale grupper (i motsetning til klassesolidaritet eller solidaritet innenfor "the science community", "gay community" etc) og et stort nok antall mennesker til at det faktisk betyr noe. > En annan kritik av mitt papper du gör rör orden "felles inte- > resser". Ja, människor som har gemensamma intressen kan ibland > bilda samfund över de geografiska samfunden i och med att de > umgås och ser varandra. Fast å andra sidan har jag ju ganska > hårda krav på vardaglig kontakt och lokala kulturer som resultat > av alla kontakter tillsammans (+ gårdagens lokala kultur + deras > interaktion etc, väldigt komplicerat). Det uppfyller sällan "the > science community", "the gay community" (för att ta exempel som > t o m i namnen indikerar en gemenskap) eller några andra. Her er jeg tilboeyelig til aa vaere enig med deg. > Kan du inte baka in solidariteten i det pragmatiska grundlaget? > Det tycker jag du gjort ovan. Eller rättare sagt _vi_ eftersom > jag erkänt dess betydelse. Det er vel delvis pragmatisk (naar jeg sier ovenfor at nasjonalsolidariteten har bedre sjanser til aa fungere enn verdenssolidaritet eller Type II- samfunnssolidaritet), men har ogsaa en mer prinsipiell side ved seg ved at nasjonen kan vaere et "naturlig" objekt (i mangel av et bedre ord) for solidaritet, selv om mye av nasjonalfoelelsen aapenbart er tillaert. > F ö tror jag förespråkare av national- > staten kommer att få det svårt i framtiden. Just nu finns ingen > debatt, det har du rätt i. Den mäktiga nationalstatsideologin > sitter där den sitter medan den försvarslös beskjuts från alla > håll. Nationalstaten tror ännu inte den måste försvara sig och > därför verkar "debatten" överlägset vinnas av attackerarna. > Jag tror nationalstaten kommer att först falla, sedan utarbeta > ett ideologiskt försvar (du är före din tid, du har redan börjat), > och till sist återupprätta sig själv i annan form (...för att > sedan bli attackerad på nytt av ännu mer finslipade debattörer > etc...). Det är så den utveckligen av ideologier brukar se ut > tycker jag. Her tror jeg du faktisk er litt for optimistisk paa nasjonalstatens vegne. Det er mulig at vi vil se et mer velfundert ideologisk forsvar for den vinne frem, men jeg er ganske sikker paa at den gamle enhetsstatens dager er talte, og det er den som har vaert sterkest knyttet til nasjonen og nasjonalstaten. Jeg vil ikke spaa om hva som vil komme istedenfor. Ideologisk ser det ut til at ulike former for foederalisme har overtaket for tida, men mer anarkistiske modeller, eller systemer hvor hvert individ og hvert lokalsamfunn kan tilhoere forskjellige, delvis overlappende strukturer paa hoeyere nivaa, kan ogsaa vinne frem. Jeg regner med at nasjonen vil ha en rolle i alt dette, men hvor sterk rolle, det er et annet spoersmaal. Beklager viss dette er litt forvirrende; jeg har ikke fullstendig orden i tankene mine for tida, og selv om jeg hadde det, er det ikke sikkert jeg ville vaert i stand til aa uttrykke meg klart i skrift. Dette ble veldig langt; jeg haaper jeg har lykkes i aa si det jeg oensket aa si naa... -- ______ ______________________________________ / | | | jon | jon ivar skullerud | \______ | jskuller@physics.adelaide.edu.au | \ | (I hate my username!) | ivar | | http://www.ph.ed.ac.uk/~jonivar/ | _______/ |______________________________________| From cml@df.lth.se Sat Sep 28 11:04:10 1996 Message-Id: Date: Sat, 28 Sep 1996 03:33:39 +0100 To: jon ivar skullerud From: cml@df.lth.se (C Malte Lewan) Subject: Re: Community regionalism in Europe Status: RO >I historisk sammenheng tror jeg man kan si at nasjonalstaten er den >foerste sekulaere, ikke-foeydale styreformen, i moderne tid i alle >fall. I saa maate er den en klar forbedring i forhold til de >fyrstedoemmer, keiserriker og pavedoemmer (med deres innbyrdes >avhengighet og stridigheter) som gikk forut. Nasjonalstaten tillot >ogsaa et mer "transparent" demokratisk styresett enn foeydalveldet, >og var muligens en historisk forutsetning for moderne demokrati. > >Det kan ogsaa argumenteres med at nasjonalstaten virket stabiliserende, >spesielt i omraader med religioese stridigheter, i den grad man >kunne erstatte lojaliteten til Gud og det religioese overhodet med >lojalitet mot staten. I de tilfeller hvor nasjonen er sterkt >identifisert med en bestemt religion eller konfesjon, kan det virke >i motsatt retning, men det er uklart i hvor stor grad nasjonalstaten >kan forsterke religioese motsetninger som allerede finnes. Den >kan imidlertid brukes til aa undertrykke religioese minoriteter. Inget av detta har jag negot att invdnda mot. Det dr mvjligt (jag vill inte sdga sdkert) att nationalstaten en geng var nvdvdndig och pe sin tid tror jag ganska sdkert att den utgjorde en fvrbdttring. >Jeg tror at nasjonalismen var for det aller meste en progressiv ide >paa begynnelsen av 1800-tallet, og i mindre grad helt frem til >1. verdenskrig. Jeg tenker her paa de ideene som oppsto i den >tyske romantikken, og siden paa de nasjonale bevegelsene for aa >frigjoere seg fra multinasjonale imperier som Oesterrike og Tyrkia. >1. verdenskrig inneholder begge sider (baade gode og daarlige) >-- krigen var bare mulig fordi man paa begge sider identifiserte >seg med nasjonen, og demoniserte motparten, og den ble gjort mer >grusom av at det var nasjonene (inkludert sivilbefolkningen) som >var i krig, ikke bare fyrstene og deres haerer. Paa den andre >siden foerte den til opploesningen av Oesterrike-Ungarn og det >ottomanske imperiet, og etableringen av folkeforbundet. Alt dette >var utslag av nasjonalistisk ideologi. Samma som ovan. Din analys fvljer mina egna tankar hyfsat ndra. Och uttrycker bra en intressant grundldggande idi. >> I vilket fall se behvver ju inte solidariteten bara ge i riktning >> andra medlemmar i Typ III-samfundet. Jag menar dr att vera >> politiska enheter meste etableras av praktiska skdl (anpassade >> till de naturliga samfunden), men solidariteten dr en annan sak >> som folk bvr kdnna dnde oavsett etablerade Typ III-samfund. Och >> dagens indelning av Typ III-samfund (som jag nu tydligen bvrjat >> anvdnda som synonym till nationalstater) dr ofta inte den >> naturliga fvr mdnniskor. Fvr folk som lever i grdnszoner ter sig >> denna ensidiga indoktrinerade solidaritet med bara national- >> statens medborgare vdldigt onaturlig. > >Det er utvilsomt sant, men det er tildels et utslag av at de >nasjonalistiske prinsippene ikke har blitt fulgt ved >grensedragningen... Spesielt gjelder dette der man har statsloese >nasjoner, og minoriteter som har havnet paa "feil" side av grensen. >I andre tilfeller er det aapenbart et utslag av at det ikke fins >noen klart definert nasjon, eller at ulike nasjoner eller etniske >grupper lever om hverandre. I disse tilfellene er det klart at >nasjonalstats-prinsippet ikke virker. Detta gdller delvis Skene ddr samhdllvetenskapliga processer fvrsvker dra med regionen i en vverdriven svensk nationalism som inte motsvarar befolkningens syn pe sig sjdlva som delvis ockse hemmahvrande i en dansk/europeisk-kontinental region ddr svenskheten dr mindre viktig (men existerar). Skeningarna dr inte pe fel sida grdnsen (idag) men stvrs av en fvrenklad nationalistisk svensk kultur. Ingen ny grdns- dragning kan rddda Skene, bara en totalt ny syn pe nationalstatens funktion eller/och en federalisering av den. Och som jag ser det: en federalisering av Europa. >> Vdrldssolidaritet dr en >> sak. Nationalitetssolidaritet dr en annan. Det dr den senare jag >> vdnder mig mot i min kritik av Typ III-samfund. > >Verdenssolidaritet er en fin tanke, men jeg er redd det er lenge >til folk flest vil vaere i stand til aa solidarisere seg med alle >mennesker i hele verden -- spesielt ettersom man beveger seg mer og >mer mot et "meg foerst"-samfunn. Og en solidaritet basert paa bare >Type I eller II samfunn blir for snever. Nasjonalsolidaritet blir >et slags kompromiss; en solidaritet som omfatter alle sosiale grupper >(i motsetning til klassesolidaritet eller solidaritet innenfor >"the science community", "gay community" etc) og et stort nok antall >mennesker til at det faktisk betyr noe. Problemet dr fvr oss som inte lever i nationalstaternas kdrnland att vi onaturligt styrs in pe en solidaritet som riktar sig pe ett fren vert sdtt att se underligt format omrede som inte motsvarar den naturliga. Nationalsolidaritet me vara en kompromiss men ingen (inte jag heller) accepterar naturligtvis att tillhvra en region som permanent hamnar i fren veran synvinkel kulturellt bakvatten. Jag meste fvrklara: Typ II-samfundet dr som sagt det hvgsta samfundet jag vill acceptera. Men solidariteten utanfvr denna kan mycket vdl ge utanfvr. Den behvver inte ge till vdrldsolidaritet direkt (dven om jag nog personligen gdrna skulle se det), t ex i Skenes fall istdllet till vissa delar av Danmark, norra Tyskland och Polen som dr ndr- regionen i stvrre bemdrkelse. Jag hoppas och tror att vi idag inte behvver _uppifren_ lesa in regioner i fasta nationalstater fvr att folket i regionen ska forceras kdnna ansvar och intresse dven fvr mdnniskor dven utanfvr Typ II-samfundet. Pe 1800-talet ja, kanske, men inte nu. Det vore vdl en ganska pessimistisk syn? Det ska idag kunna ske genom information och utbildning istdllet fvr obligatoriska positioner som tvingar in olika regioner av ett land i ett system ddr man meste stvdja varandra och ddr det ddrmed blir begrdnsat vver till samfundens egna initiativ. >Beklager viss dette er litt forvirrende; jeg har ikke fullstendig orden >i tankene mine for tida, og selv om jeg hadde det, er det ikke sikkert >jeg ville vaert i stand til aa uttrykke meg klart i skrift. Det dr svera saker det hdr, att uttrycka och att diskutera. Jag kommer ibland pe mig med att motsdga mig sjdlv och funderar de pe om jag bara vdljer en tes och sedan fvrsvker lappa ihop resonemangen utanfvr. Det kdnns ibland som jag kan hitta tve vvertygande argument fvr tve skilda teser, vvertyga mig sjdlv om att de dr mycket starka och sedan upptdcker deras motsatsfvrhellande! Men fvr det mesta ger det bra. :-) Det dr en bildningsprocess. bdsta hdlsningar /Malte From daemon Sat Mar 1 06:41:15 1997 To: jskuller@physics.adelaide.edu.au (jon ivar skullerud) In-Reply-To: <857088493.12458@dejanews.com> Subject: Re: Never-ending EU integration? From: cml@df.lth.se (C Malte Lewan) Date: Fri, 28 Feb 1997 21:13:35 +0200 Message-Id: <199702282113351956398@nek92mle.student.lu.se> Status: RO [ A copy of this message has been posted to the newsgroup ] [ talk.politics.european-union ] jon ivar skullerud wrote: [Concerning a specific paragraph] > I'd like to find something to disagree with in what you've written here, > but I can't :) I agree with everything you've written in your posting that I've cut except what you very well know I don't. :) The same goes for the other posting. [Concerning constant constitutional debate] > So let me play devil's advocate for a moment: You can always use the > argument "if it ain't broken, don't fix it". I think this is a quite > valid counter to any kind of calls for "change for change's sake". It _is_ a valid counter. I think the answer is that it's impossible to estimate whether a constitution is broken or not. It's very dependent on what political society you want to accomplish with it and if the constitution you presently use is the best way to attain this. You might think you have the ideal constituion for your purposes and you never know that you would be happier with another one because you've never considered another one. Since this is not something you can know for sure, it must continously be discussed and evaluated just like politics itself. That is not to take away the extra-ordinary authority that lies in the constitutional document and the strict caution that has to prevail before changing it. It's the _debate_ I want to see more of, not a simplification in the ways to change it (in fact, the contrary, as you probably know). > In article <199702241323123358726@nek92mle.student.lu.se>, > > Of course I'm also looking back in disgust at how the nation state > > period of this century has prevented (in very different ways) the > > natural integration between Scania and Sjælland (and northern Germany) > > and how political initiatives because of structure have been lacking to > > remove political, economical, social and psychological etc barriers to > > any degree comparable to within the nation states and how they instead > > in reality have reinforced them. > > Oh sure. I don't think there's any disagreement between us on this point= . > (Unless you start talking about the Øresund bridge...) The bridge is good. :-) In fact, essential, like for example the highway between Stockholm and Uppsala is. Crotte, have I started talking about the Øresund bridge now? > > How much the EU will help this remains > > to be seen but to me, the EU is hope, if nothing else (well there are > > some concrete "else"s in transregional funds and more > > That's probably where my cynicism sets in. Sure, the EU can facilitate > some cross-border initiatives. That's good. But I think the EU is > still stuck in some very old-style thinking, requiring all political > institutions to be neatly ordered in a descending hierarchy, where > every lower institution is a proper subset of one unique higher > institution. If, in this model, interregional bodies should play an > important role, that would require the dismantling of the nations as > the level between the EU and the regions. I don't see that happening. > > As further evidence, consider the reaction of many EUphiles to the > idea of "variable geometry". This is a big step towards the kind of > Europe I would want to see, and the acceptance of this idea might, > just possibly, also encourage the adoption of similar models within > nations and between regions across national borders. But the idea is > often rejected out of hand as contrary to the fundamental idea of the > EU, and when it is (reluctantly) accepted it is normally distorted as > "multi-speed" (as if we were all going towards the same unique > destination) or division into "core" and "outer rim". But the EU is happening. It's happening in practise and I always settle for what I can get. There is a challenge (at least might develop into a full-blown challenge) to the nation state Europe which has put especially border regions all over Europe in positions of constantly lost initiatives on all levels of society; political, economical, cultural etc. But also other transnational initiatives other than the border areas are internalized and confined to the own state (now I'm mostly extra-polating the concrete border zone actuality that I see everyday). The old order has had its chances and I don't trust it anymore. What can you offer me? Well, first of all, you can't offer me anything since the ideas you may have are not happening as a strong political movement. The EU negative side in Sweden couldn't even offer me the ideas, even less a political force that even in part carried some sort of change sweeping through Europe. More importantly, I haven't yet understand your vision. Somebody has to make the laws of a specific territory. But it can be shared between different levels of government. Sometimes then, there is a row about who is entitled to make the law and a constitutional court in a federal state decides. Do you suggest having horizontally different political institutions with different responsabilities in law making who then compete in this task? Isn't the vertical federal model more realistic? If it's built from down to top in multi-tier federalism, it can leave the lower levels as much autonomy as they want and allow as much cooperation between them as they want and cooperation on whatever level they want. I haven't thought through before what I interpret as your suggestion because nobody has described a complete vision to me yet. If I did buy it, I'd probably end by saying: "Yes, that might be better, but that option is not yet on offer as a political reality. It's in the air in today's political climate. Would I put my trust in abandoning the solutions I have a chance of getting?". You may now attack my ideas of the ideal federalism as something you think I won't attain in the current EU either. What is most important to me is to play along with a change that I estimate as positive. I can't hope for improvements if I _start_ by saying "no" when something is happening. But, as I said before, EU is what I consider not entirely unfounded hope of more progress and a development _and_ the concrete interregional money and useful harmonizing (eg the EMU to me) that I actually can measure. I don't want to get more abstract than that in my argument. Not anymore.*) *) I think I can if I get into a situation with other experiences of possible true high costs of having every state doing its race without a central European body coordinating certain things. Or maybe if I read a lot of books on the subject etc... -- Malte Lewan Longa Onivarsiteid, Scania, EO Tengtcen ølle redgijonal! cml@df.lth.se http://www.df.lth.se/~cml Always think regionally! From daemon Sun Mar 9 18:11:24 1997 Date: Sun, 09 Mar 1997 01:41:06 -0600 From: jon ivar skullerud Subject: Re: Never-ending EU integration? Newsgroups: talk.politics.european-union Message-Id: <857893078.9778@dejanews.com> References: <32F93622.2650@xs4all.nl> <199702282113471957131@nek92mle.student.lu.se> Status: RO [This is a courtesy copy of an article posted to Usenet via Deja News] In article <199702282113471957131@nek92mle.student.lu.se>, cml@df.lth.se (C Malte Lewan) wrote: > > jon ivar skullerud wrote: > [Concerning constant constitutional debate] > > So let me play devil's advocate for a moment: You can always use the > > argument "if it ain't broken, don't fix it". I think this is a quite > > valid counter to any kind of calls for "change for change's sake". > > It _is_ a valid counter. I think the answer is that it's impossible to > estimate whether a constitution is broken or not. [snip] > It's the _debate_ I want to see more of, not > a simplification in the ways to change it (in fact, the contrary, as you > probably know). I guess I agree with you, but then I belong to the chattering classes myself :-0 As I said, that's fine at least as long as a preoccupation with these issues does not distract from other issues which are more important to most people. > > Oh sure. I don't think there's any disagreement between us on this point. > > (Unless you start talking about the Xresund bridge...) > > The bridge is good. :-) In fact, essential, like for example the > highway between Stockholm and Uppsala is. Crotte, have I started talking > about the Xresund bridge now? Don't get me going! Transport policy is another of my hobbyhorses. If it makes you feel better, I can start attacking the motorway (I assume that's what you meant) between Stockholm and Uppsala as well, though the two are not quite comparable... [on my cynicism towards the EU's possible progressive role] > But the EU is happening. It's happening in practise and I always settle > for what I can get. There is a challenge (at least might develop into a > full-blown challenge) to the nation state Of course you have to take into account what is in fact happening, and the EU is part of that. I am not denying that the challenge the EU is posing to the nation state can have and has some positive effects. In the days when I was pro-EC, this was indeed my main (probably my only) argument. I have later come to the conclusion that, on balance, the EU replaces something bad (the nation state) with more of the same. > The old order has had its chances and I don't trust it anymore. Hey, that was supposed to be *my* line! > What can you offer me? Well, first of all, you can't offer me > anything since the ideas you may have are not happening as a strong > political movement. The EU negative side in Sweden couldn't even offer > me the ideas, even less a political force that even in part carried some > sort of change sweeping through Europe. I'm not sure what you expected to hear. Are you saying that *nobody* had any visions for what kind of Europe they wanted? That sounds strange,and doesn't quite fit in with my experiences. As for political forces, I know my ideas have always been unfashionable. I don't feel any urge to go with political fashion. > More importantly, I haven't yet understand your vision. First of all, I don't know if I want to call it a vision. Grand visions is one of the things I want to avoid, since they have such a tendency to turn nasty. I want each community, region, state, etc, to be able to determine its own political and economic system -- as wide a diversity of political and economic systems as is possible and desirable. I don't believe there is one size that fits all, but that is what I fear the EU is trying to achieve. > Somebody has to make the laws of a specific territory. Why? > But it can be shared between > different levels of government. Sometimes then, there is a row about who > is entitled to make the law and a constitutional court in a federal > state decides. Do you suggest having horizontally different political > institutions with different responsabilities in law making who then > compete in this task? I'm not sure if they will compete, but yes, I think you've got the gist of it. It's not such a novel thing either, since this is basically how international law is made. You do need a mechanism for conflict resolution where the responsibilities of two institutions may overlap, but that is different from having a single (federal) government. Basically, this is an elaboration of the principle that decisions are made by those affected by the decision, and also takes into account that people may have several allegiances which do not necessarily coincide with any predefined territorial borders. > If I did buy it, I'd probably end by saying: "Yes, that might be better, > but that option is not yet on offer as a political reality. It's in the > air in today's political climate. Would I put my trust in abandoning the > solutions I have a chance of getting?". No "vision" or whatever you call it will ever be on offer as a political reality. So you have to assess whether the concrete changes that are on offer go in the right or wrong direction, on balance, and whether they make your long-term aims more or less achievable. > You may now attack my ideas of the ideal federalism as something you > think I won't attain in the current EU either. What is most important to > me is to play along with a change that I estimate as positive. I can't > hope for improvements if I _start_ by saying "no" when something is > happening. But that doesn't mean you have to say "yes" to everything, whether you think it's good or not? Of course not, and I don't think that was what you meant either, was it? You think that the EU has potential to be a step on the way to the kind of federalism you want. So your attitude to concrete proposals is determined on whether or not they will lead in that direction. (I believe you are making a *huge* mistake in endorsing EMU, since it seems to me like a step in the wrong direction from your point of view. But I won't press you on that right now.) My attitude to proposals for change is determined on whether or not they are compatible with the kind of world I want. I have said before that I am in favour of the idea of variable geometry. I see this as a development towards the kind of Europe (and world) I would like to see -- it chimes in quite well with my idea of overlapping, non-exclusive institutions. If the EU moves in that direction, I would reconsider my opposition -- but then again, in such a Europe the question would not be whether you're "in" or "out", but *what* you are in and out of. Sorry if this seems very confused. I have problems with thinking today... jon ivar -- Paranoia is when you know all the facts (Shooglenifty, 1997) -------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====----------------------- http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Post to Usenet From jskuller Thu Mar 19 13:41:06 1998 Date: Thu, 19 Mar 98 13:41:06 From: jon ivar skullerud Subject: Re: Regional functionalism vs Federalism To: cml@df.lth.se (C Malte Lewan), chbeun@worldonline.nl (Herman Beun), olvil@wmdata.com (Ole Villumsen), hesselin@math.ruu.nl (Dennis Hesseling) In-Reply-To: C Malte Lewan's message of Sat, 15 Mar 1997 03:07:19 +0200 Organization: Confused Phone: +61-(0)8-8303 3542 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset˙so-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Mailer: Ream version 5.1.51 (Mailers Have Feelings Too) X-Spam: $500 charged per unsolicited email Fcc: +manifest Status: RO Content-Length: 24326 Lines: 459 Yep, here we go ... *%^> ... Dennis asked if we could explain regional functionalism in about 3 sentences. Well, this will be about 300 sentences instead ... So, perhaps, a 3-sentence summary first of all, for the benefit of those who didn't follow the debate a year ago: Regional system-transforming functionalism is based on cooperation between (self-defined) regions which is not fixed to a specific structure. The regions decide for themselves on which areas and with which other regions they will cooperate and pool sovereignty, and they may decide to cooperate with different regions and using different interregional bodies for different purposes. This avoids the centralising tendency and rigid structures inherent in federalism. You don't have to read any further if you don't want to -- on the other hand, you'll miss out on quite a lot of arguments and examples.... And if anyone replies to this, i will give no guarantee that it won't take me over a year to reply again. Now, the oldest thing i have in my inbox is a 336-liner that Herman composed in august ... C Malte Lewan writes: > This got a bit long maybe...:) You bet! [ Malte's "short" intro and various extraneous issues snipped. ] > jon ivar skullerud wrote: > > In article <199702282113471957131@nek92mle.student.lu.se>, > > cml@df.lth.se (C Malte Lewan) wrote: [ cutting directly to the point... ] > > > Somebody has to make the laws of a specific territory. > > > > Why? > > Eh, otherwise we would have anarchy (of which the advantages/ > disadvantages I'm not really ready to discuss for the moment). Well, we'll leave that to one side for now. > I don't mean that someone - singular - has to make _all_ the laws of > a specific territory. Maybe that's what it looks like from my > phrasing. I mean that behind one law, there has to be one (or > possibly several co-operating) institution(s) acting as one > authority. Actually, what i was challenging here, was the notion of laws being based on territory. It has struck me that this is a rather old-fashioned idea which may not be necessary today. There are many groupings and issues that transcend territory, which could perhaps be legislated for on a different basis. But that's a different discussion... > > > But it can be shared between > > > different levels of government. Sometimes then, there is a row about who > > > is entitled to make the law and a constitutional court in a federal > > > state decides. Do you suggest having horizontally different political > > > institutions with different responsabilities in law making who then > > > compete in this task? > > > > I'm not sure if they will compete, but yes, I think you've got the gist > > of it. It's not such a novel thing either, since this is basically how > > international law is made. You do need a mechanism for conflict > > resolution where the responsibilities of two institutions may overlap, > > but that is different from having a single (federal) government. > > Basically, this is an elaboration of the principle that decisions are > > made by those affected by the decision, and also takes into account > > that people may have several allegiances which do not necessarily > > coincide with any predefined territorial borders. [ snip definitions of functionalism, federalism, transactions analysis, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. check out 8.1 and 8.2 in http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/fed-integr-dd.txt for details ] > As I interpret the situation, your views are closest to the > system-transforming functionalism in contrast to all these British > intergovernmentalists in this group. I may be attacked for labeling > individual people now (you're more that welcome to correct my mistakes) I haven't attacked you for this for the last year, and i won't attack you now :-) > Scania is situated in the New Europe of Horizontally Overlapping > Authorities ("system-transforming functionalism"). Some laws are made by > the regional parliament, that is those that can't be made on a lower > level of government without something valuble getting lost > (Economically, politically? What is this eigentlich according to the > subsidiarity principle?). But then Scania doesn't want to take care of > certain "big politics" tasks, such as defence and foreign policy. So... > Denmark makes the laws for Scania concerning foreign policy and Sweden > makes the laws for Scania concerning defense and we have the same > currency and central bank as Northern Germany and laws of the North > German Republic are regulating these things. Additionally, the Council > of Europe makes our laws concerning human rights, for example. Etc. Who > does what is regulated in both the Scanian constitution and the > constitution of the partner authority in question. In the Swedish > constitution, you'll read that the defense territory includes the > Autonomous Territory of Scania (and is also the area for mandatory > conscription) and in the Danish constitution, it's written that Denmark > makes our foreign policy. All this is further recognized by several > international institutions. I'm not sure if it's possible to separate defence and foreign policy, so your example here may be a bit far-fetched ... anyway, in my world there wouldn't be any military forces ... > But additionally, let's say that Sweden also takes care of environmental > concerns and Denmark of infrastructure. And one day, the Danish > government decides to build a bridge between Helsingør and Helsingborg > and the Swedish government forbids this (makes a law against it, I > suppose) because it's environmentally harmful. And Denmark takes Sweden > to court. Now, the first question pops up: which is the court? The soon > almighty International Court of Justice? Doesn't have to be, right? > Denmark and Sweden can have chosen the North European Court of Justice > (not yet invented of course) to decide in these matters. Or the > International Court of Global Environment. Or the Court for All Disputes > Where the Participants Start with Consonants (CADWPSC). In short: the > choice of court is arbitrary (but agreement on where to settle the > conflicts has to be made beforehand of course). > Ok, I see a vision here and a very appealing one. But: won't it be crazy > with all these judicial disputes about who's in charge? It would be, but would there necessarily be so many disputes? Would there be more judicial disputes than today? I mean, in today's situation you can almost be certain that any contentious decision will be appealed all the way right up to the top court. Or courts. [As a side issue, i think one reason why many environment and human rights groups are so keen on federalism is that it gives them more basis to appeal against local and regional decisions they don't like. We are likely to see the Australian government being taken right up to the International Court of Justice soon, because of their stance on native title (or was it the Jabiluka uranium mine -- well, that also has to do with native title). I am not convinced that this is a good reason. I think it is a rather short-sighted attitude, to be honest.] But back to the point. As you say further on, people could just adjust to the situation and work around issues -- and bilateral discussions and mediation should be tried before going to the courts. Also, in some cases an option would be to go back to the people directly concerned ... I think what i'm trying to get through is that the demarcation disputes you are worried about are more or less the cases that would end up being appealed to the federal court in a federal system. So the crucial questions are 1) Will the possible proliferation of courts invite a proliferation of appeals to different courts? Cf the situation today where a decision may be appealed both to the ECJ and the ECHR. But if countries (regions, whatever) have nominated one court for resolution of each potential area of dispute, this should not be a problem. 2) Will there be demarcation disputes between courts? That is really the nightmare scenario. I think the answer to 1) is also the answer to 2). 3) Will it still be possible to appeal to a higher (World) court? I'd say only if there are international treaties covering the area (and which don't have their own court). In other cases, the process defined under 1) should exhaust the possibilites for appeals. In fact, this might ensure there are *less*, not more court cases than in a federal system where you normally can have a quite long appeals process. And decisions are kept closer to those they concern... > Much time in the New Europe of Regional System-Transforming > Functionalism might be devoted to judicial disputes. Won't the > courts get politicized very quickly? Are you telling me the courts are not already politicised? The US Supreme Court is a highly political body. The European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights are political -- the former even has an explicit federalist agenda. The Australian High Court is political -- it has played an essential role in the increasing centralisation of this country -- and is rapidly becoming more so, thanks to court cases on issues such as native title and free speech. *Any* 'supreme' court with any clout and with a brief on contentious issues will be politicised very quickly. I don't think federalism has any advantages over functionalism here, perhaps quite the opposite is the case. > And who wouldn't like to bribe a judge? Will we be electing judges > to the North European Court of Justice? Who are we who elect them? > Or maybe, who are _they_ who elect them?* I want to know because > these people will possibly eventually decide whether there will be > built a bridge between Helsingør and Helsingborg. Of course, this > problem is introduced already in the federal model but is > accentuated in the functional model. Is it? The only extra problem i can see is the increased employment opportunities for judges ... and not everyone will think this is a problem :-) > I understand that this can be said to be just the principles of > international law applied to smaller communities. Then, one needs to > consider why international law has not had a bigger success than it has > had (well, I know you tend to point out when the results are > underestimated by participants in this group). There is the question of > how to sanction a party breaking his contracts. Will this be regulated > by isolating participants etc? I think we should first distinguish between demarcation disputes (like your example above) and disputes under common international treaties. The latter can (and in the future, probably will) include their own enforcement mechanisms. So you say we need some mechanism for enforcement of arbitrations in 'civil' cases (demarcation disputes) between states etc. One would hope that in practice, these enforcement mechanisms won't be necessary -- most people, and most small countries at least, want to be seen as law-abiding citizens, and that is sufficient enforcement. But we also know that larger countries routinely flout international law, and some smaller countries do so as well (Israel, for instance). So i guess you're right... Actually, there is no particular reason why the treaty establishing a particular court should not also include an enforcement mechanism -- presumably some kind of economic sanction (fines, or a freeze on funds, being the primary 'punishments'). Problem solved? > Some of the problem with functionalism vs *neofunctionalism* I think > lies in that regional functionalism just finds a very good final model > but it's a static model. It doesn't take into considerations political > realities like how it works in practise getting there starting from > today's world. What are the forces that can bring it about? I think i'd rely not so much on states 'giving' power to regions as on people 'taking' power from the states. There are lots of regionalist and other democratic movements around the place. And most of them are very interested in working with other regions -- on their terms, not those of the 'nation states'. A lot of regionalist and 'mini-nationalist' movements already cooperate closely with their relatives in other regions. For instance, the Scottish and Welsh nationalists will undoubtedly be working for close cooperation between Scotland and Wales -- and, if possible, with other Celtic regions of the British Isles. So, basically, my dynamics is based on grassroots movements (successfully) demanding devolution, and then entering into sensible partnerships. > Are the nation states enough interested in transferring powers to > international institutions just like that (= letting go of power for > the politicians) or are the clever spill-over effects from > neofunctionalism needed (ok, a more "primitive" type of functional > spill-over *is* part of the functionalistic theory - but not the > other types of spill-over at all). I think you are being very elitist here -- as if all change could only come from the top. That is simply not true. > To me, it's quite clear that neofunctionalism has given us a very fast > integration for Europe (which I think give hopes for my regions) while > functionalism has given us things like the Nordic council that is a very > limited type of integration. Well, you know that 'integration' is not my aim ... so i'll pass on that one. > We're getting a regionally elected parliament in Scania in 1999. > At times, I'm told that it's not necessary. "The municipalities can form > their own regional leagues. What do you need a regional parliament for?" > Well, they *can* but the answer is more complicated and has to do with > having a political arena for regional politics and not least: political > spill-over. One has to think less static then. I think i'm confused here. What are you trying to say? What precisely is the difference between a Scanian parliament and a regional league of Scanian municipalities? Why couldn't the Scanian municipalities have set up the parliament? > In the depicted Scanian example, if the North European Court of Justice > grants Sweden the right to stop the construction of the bridge and > Denmark refuses to take notice, what can be done? On the other hand, > what can be done today if Schleswig-Holstein refuses to follow a > decision made by the German Surpreme Court? We expect and trust them not > to. That's basically it. We can't (and don't want to) use military > violence in the west today anymore. Is that your anwer to your previous question about enforcement of court decisions? In that case, i guess that's my answer as well. *If* Slesvig-Holstein refuses to take notice of the German Supreme Court, refuse to pay their fines, etc, there's not a lot the Court can do bar sending in the troops (and they don't want to do that). *If* Denmark refuses to take notice of the North European Court of Arbitration, refuse to pay their fines, etc, there's not a lot the Court can do bar calling for the UN or OSCE to send in troops, and they don't want to do that. Of course, Denmark's (Slesvig-Holstein's) standing with their neighbours will take a huge dive, which will probably harm their economy and the prestige of the leaders... > Are nation states (including federal > states) today's solutions to the lack of faith we have in territories > and their populations regulating their businesses among themselves with > some threat of violence lieing (Jesus, how do you spell lie-ing!?) lying > behind it all. In the nation states, there can be said to lie a > conceiled threat of use of force even though it hardly can be used > anymore in the western democracies. Or can it? By arresting the leaders > who are breaking the law? It maybe doesn't need to be military violence > that is today's way of sanctioning violations of intrastate "treaties". > Violence of the police may be closer to today's ultimate threat (before > the fines and all that). ... but violence of the police is only a threat on the domestic scene. Ok, you could use police to arrest leaders who refuse to follow international law, but i'm not sure how useful that would be. In federal or international disputes, the police cannot be a participant -- witness the standoffs between federal and local police in various places. I think the ultimate international threat is really economic sanctions (and travel bans etc) of various kinds -- though the blunt instrument of trade embargoes is becoming pretty discredited, more targeted sanctions may be useful. > No, the regional model of system-transforming functionalism is not a > federal model. It refuses to be bound by the hierarchical structure of > federalism with its exclusive horizontal authorities and powers. > Federalism introduces constitutional power sharing that the unitary > state can't conceive of being such a primitive creation. You added the > idea of horizontal power sharing which I find very interesting but I > still have my doubts about its practicability. > Further, most important for our initial discussion is whether nation > state Europe or federal Europe is the best starting point to achieve it. > For the nation states, I grant that functionalism is easier to reach > from nation state Europe. It's international law. It's there to use. And > in fact, EU federalism _disturbs_ it. But from a regional point of view, > pragmatic functionalism doesn't mean much. The kind of true community > autonomy that can be reached that way is very small. That Sweden can > form one binding union with Norway concerning specific issues and > another one with Denmark concerning others is not so important for the > respective parts the countries consist of. Functionalism and federalism > are especially interesting when truly communitarian political entities > are discussed. I'd say that federalism in Europe can create the basic > ground for regional system-transforming functionalism (RSTF) by > releasing political powers, postitive circles and momenta (in short: > spill-over (with the help of neofunctionalism)) that helps empowering > the regions which then can lead to adjusting federalism (big > adjustments, changing the system - more on that next) to give the choice > of RSTF. With nation state Europe and functionalism, nothing happens for > the regions and communities IMHO. History, I'd say, tells us that. I'm not so sure i agree. I think history tells us quite a few things about federalism, not least that once power has been transferred to the federal level, it never comes back, but the federal level sucks up more and more power. Also, i cannot see a federal government demanding, or even assisting, the break-up of one of its constituent states (counter-example: Yugoslavia giving autonomous status to Kosovo and Vojvodina, but i don't think that's a good example of a true federal state, and anyway, look how it's ended). True, it may allow some limited cooperation between constituent states within the federation, but that's no more than can be achieved in a functional international framework. And i believe a federation will be *very* reluctant to give any power to regional bodies which *transcend* the borders of the federation. A bottom-up transformation of the nation-states may still be a long way off, but i'd say it's much more likely to give real power to the regions and local communities than the top-down approach you appear to advocate. > Can federalism and RSTF co-exist? Consider the example of Switzerland. > There is a central ("federal") level and a cantonal level with 23 > cantons (which btw are of sizes somewhat close to my ideal commuting > distance size). In Switzerland, the powers of the central level are > defined and the cantons get the residual powers. To know some of what > regulates the affairs between cantons, I quote my essay (chapter 5) on > http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/fed-integr-dd.txt : [...] > So, RSTF is unlawful today in Switzerland. The cantons can't create > common institutions to which they can delegate their powers. But you can > change this and make it legal *even in a federal state*. So the > provinces can create an institution common for the French speaking > cantons that takes care of linguistc questions and another one for the > urban cantons that makes the decisions concerning typical urban > political problems. All this can happen within a federal state. And then > you even have a central level that can enforce the treaties with the > threat of violence as the last resort. I don't disagree with this. But the crucial word here is *within*. It will be confined to the existing structures of the federal country. And it does not allow for cross-border cooperation without the involvement of the federal level. What if Jura and Neuchatel wanted to form a regional council with the neighbouring French départements? Or Zürich and Basel wanted to form a body with say Amsterdam and København to tackle certain urban problems? > If you find that the characteristics of RSTF are nicer than the old > federalism, you can gradually take powers from the central level and > let the cantons form their own super cantons among themselves > instead. Federalism and RSTF aren't mutually exclusive and > transitions in between the two can happen. > That I support a federal development of the EU doesn't mean that I > exclude RSTF forever. I might want to support *that* development when I > see that the regions have been enough empowered by the federal one to be > able to demand other arrangements in a challenge. And I might want to > wait until I see so much stability that I don't think the threat of > violence is necessary for it to work. I'm afraid you'd be waiting a long time for the empowerment of the regions in your approach. I think your last criterion is fulfilled already today. [EMU vs regional currencies] > *) I think Mårten Lindström open my eyes a bit further concerning this > in an article in which he followed up to yours. He kind of gave me a > vision of a Europe which works everywhere and over great distances in > the same way I most of all wish the regions around Scania would work > together, that is with no more artificial borders than we have in the > nation states. He kind of extended my thoughts of having economic, > political, social transactions unrestrained in my region to having the > same economic, political, social climate in all of Europe. But why? Why *should* there be the same economic, political, social climate in all of Europe? I don't see any reason for it. In fact, i think it would be undesirable? And if we have the same economic, political and social climate, why not the same cultural, educational and linguistic climate? > > I have said before that I am in favour of the idea of variable > > geometry. I see this as a development towards the kind of Europe > > (and world) I would like to see -- it chimes in quite well with my > > idea of overlapping, non-exclusive institutions. If the EU moves > > in that direction, I would reconsider my opposition -- but then > > again, in such a Europe the question would not be whether you're > > "in" or "out", but *what* you are in and out of. > > Now I suddenly get confused. Is this the same thing as the so scoffed at > "Europe ā la carte"? Or "Europe ā la carte" only involved one power > center whose co-operation project you could or could decide not to > belong to? I think the words you use to describe it reveal your attitude. It's called variable geometry by those who like it and Europe ā la carte by the knockers. I don't think there's any big difference. -- ______ __________________________________________________ / | | | jon | jon ivar skullerud | \______ | jskuller@physics.adelaide.edu.au | \ | http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/~jskuller/ | ivar | | Bicycle Institute of SA http://www.bisa.asn.au/ | _______/ |__________________________________________________| From daemon Sat Mar 15 12:34:25 1997 Received: from oberon.df.lth.se by adelphi.physics.adelaide.edu.au (5.65/AndrewR-930902) id AA25980; Sat, 15 Mar 1997 12:34:20 +0930 Received: from nek92mle.student.lu.se(really [130.235.200.166]) by df.lth.se via smtpd with smtp id for ; Sat, 15 Mar 1997 03:03:38 +0100 (MET) (Smail-3.2 EDT 1996-Jul- #3 built 1996-Sep-25) To: jskuller@physics.adelaide.edu.au (jon ivar skullerud) In-Reply-To: <857893078.9778@dejanews.com> Subject: Regional functionalism vs Federalism From: cml@df.lth.se (C Malte Lewan) Date: Sat, 15 Mar 1997 03:07:19 +0200 Message-Id: <199703150307195355560@nek92mle.student.lu.se> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Organization: Longa Onivarsiteid aa Longa Tekniska Hoe'jskoula X-Newsreader: MacSOUP 2.2 X-Mozilla-Status: 0001 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Status: RO Content-Length: 28994 Lines: 509 [ A copy of this message has been posted to the newsgroup ] [ talk.politics.european-union ] This got a bit long maybe...:) The short story is: I endorse EU integration and Jon Ivar does not. I've a quite long time believed in federalism and now Jon Ivar introduces another model to me (described by himself in the latest posting) that I find very interesting and which I try to explore by the help of an example and which I try to place in a political scientific vocabulary. In the end, I claim that his model has practical drawbacks or at least several question marks concerning how to get a process going in developing it (and maybe even adjusting it in its place according to changed political realities) but I keep finding it interesting and a possible development of federalism since it has the clear advantages of a freer institutional arrangement that better can be concerted to a complex reality, if in fact, its ideal static position easily can and is wanted to be found by the complicated political forces surrounding it and this can happen at a reasonable speed. Puh. Another problem is whether legal conflicts accelerate among the complicated arrangements and if judicial power as a consequence gets too strong. A third problem is if the model in the way I describe it can manage without a higher level "police" in order to avoid disorder/anarchy and so if we're ready to manage without the "police" already today. I, instead and for now, suggest a freer federalism used with some of the elements of his model and the possibility to expand the use even more and gradually. EU integration doesn't need to be a step in conflict with his freer model from a regional point of view (though probably from a nation state point of view). Did it get complicated? --- Well, this debate really struck me as touching a very important question. It's fundamental to how we should arrange our political institutions. I've written and read in political scientific literature and re-written when I've discovered that my reasonings weren't enough mature and so the order of presentation might be slightly confusing but I need to finally send this away (I really should rewrite it all). I think you should have a mouthful then. But first two clarifications on what we discussed before: jon ivar skullerud wrote: > In article <199702282113471957131@nek92mle.student.lu.se>, > cml@df.lth.se (C Malte Lewan) wrote: > > It _is_ a valid counter. I think the answer is that it's impossible to > > estimate whether a constitution is broken or not. > [snip] > > It's the _debate_ I want to see more of, not > > a simplification in the ways to change it (in fact, the contrary, as you > > probably know). > > I guess I agree with you, but then I belong to the chattering classes > myself :-0 > As I said, that's fine at least as long as a preoccupation with these > issues does not distract from other issues which are more important > to most people. Ok, just to make myself clear, I'll add that I think this _is_ important for most people that the consitutions affecting them gets evaluated regularly. I don't mean that it's for fun you should have these debates. Many people might not know it but it interfers considerably with the politics of their country and the lives of themselves in the long term. Of course, discussing constitutions just for the sake of it shouldn't become exaggerated. But, you just shouldn't avoid it due to some status of sacred document it may have. [I found some information on that in the canton of Geneve, every 15 years, there is an *obligatory* referendum on whether there should be a total revision on the constitution and the citizens almost always vote "no". That's quite nice. That adds some legitimacy to the constitution.] > > The bridge is good. :-) In fact, essential, like for example the > > highway between Stockholm and Uppsala is. Crotte, have I started talking > > about the Øresund bridge now? > > Don't get me going! Transport policy is another of my hobbyhorses. > If it makes you feel better, I can start attacking the motorway > (I assume that's what you meant) between Stockholm and Uppsala as > well, though the two are not quite comparable... Oh, I can always take a _general_ environmental debate about transport policies (though I'm not enough attracted to it to discuss it in news generally, due to lack of time). I'm quite open in that field. It's the lack of comparison between _any_ highway ("Am. väg med skilda körbanor" according to my dictionary but I guess "motorway" is fine) and this bridge that makes _me_ going. I and Ole Villumsen started debating this in mail some years ago and later we went over to a few national newsgroups and surprise, surprise, I think we reached some kind of agreement. (Or maybe some cease-fire type of thing, I don't remember all that clearly. :-) ) > > What can you offer me? Well, first of all, you can't offer me > > anything since the ideas you may have are not happening as a strong > > political movement. The EU negative side in Sweden couldn't even offer > > me the ideas, even less a political force that even in part carried some > > sort of change sweeping through Europe. > > I'm not sure what you expected to hear. Are you saying that *nobody* > had any visions for what kind of Europe they wanted? That sounds > strange,and doesn't quite fit in with my experiences. I'm not saying that. Some visions of a future Europe were given (less on the no side than on the yes side if I remember correctly and if I don't have a too selective memory (possible that too)) but they didn't appeal to me. They gave me no solution to the problem of the all dominating position of the nation state and pretty much didn't bring up the problem (more of a "*pragmatic* functionalism" - see below). Neither did the yes side on TV or the major newspapers and I had to turn to other views that were presented. Additionally, I think (reaching down into a very vague memory) the visions of the no side often were very leftist and welfare conservative minded (although the *arguments* against sometimes could be more moderate and thoughtful). > > Somebody has to make the laws of a specific territory. > > Why? Eh, otherwise we would have anarchy (of which the advantages/ disadvantages I'm not really ready to discuss for the moment). I don't mean that someone - singular - has to make _all_ the laws of a specific territory. Maybe that's what it looks like from my phrasing. I mean that behind one law, there has to be one (or possibly several co-operating) institution(s) acting as one authority. > > But it can be shared between > > different levels of government. Sometimes then, there is a row about who > > is entitled to make the law and a constitutional court in a federal > > state decides. Do you suggest having horizontally different political > > institutions with different responsabilities in law making who then > > compete in this task? > > I'm not sure if they will compete, but yes, I think you've got the gist > of it. It's not such a novel thing either, since this is basically how > international law is made. You do need a mechanism for conflict > resolution where the responsibilities of two institutions may overlap, > but that is different from having a single (federal) government. > Basically, this is an elaboration of the principle that decisions are > made by those affected by the decision, and also takes into account > that people may have several allegiances which do not necessarily > coincide with any predefined territorial borders. I think you have a model and a very interesting one too. I re-read some old poli-sci articles and found established labels for different views on integration. I use a book of Mårten Kellstrup (source below). There are basically five: functionalism, federalism, transactions analysis, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. They are quite complicated and so I will be very brief. For those of you who speak Swedish, you can, to know more, check out chapters 8.1 and 8.2 in my poli-sci essay on http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/fed-integr-dd.txt . Transactions analysis is focusing on just what the economic, socio-cultural and political identity *exchange* is between different political territories. They have no interest in any kind of institutions. Intergovernmentalism is focusing on integration between governments who represent all of their peoples in one vote or voice. They have only interest in *governmental* institutions and is supposed to be the typical British view. Neofunctionalism is the most explored and advanced theory and the one that usually is used to describe the integration of the EU. Its trademarks are the spill-over effects which really are positive (or negative) circles. They are (1) functional (/automatic) spill-over that is initial (economic mostly I think) interdependence that are accelerated as a result of integration, (2) political (/vouluntary) spill-over that is based on politicians discovering that the new power centra better satify their demands and so power is moved there and (3) cultivated spill-over that is how the presence of common institutions can accelarate integration (more explanations would be needed here of course). Federalism is both an integration theory and a static system. As an integration theory, it expects integration to go in big steps. The creation of Germany and Switzerland are examples of federal integration. Neofederalism is related but doesn't believe in the big steps but instead in the small gradual steps. Functionalism (older than most of the other integration theories but old ideas often come back in amended smarter versions later) is the belief that international institutions (like the UN) can solve the problems that nation states can not. The result should be "a multitude of international organizations in different, functionally specific areas." There is pragmatic functionalism that still retains the state as the most important unit ("do not seek to the abolish the state" is in fact the expression used by Kellstrup) and there is the more radical form system-transforming functionalism that wants to "overcome" the dominance of the nation states. Kellstrup is not kind to this second "utopian strategy" but who said he had to agree? As I interpret the situation, your views are closest to the system-transforming functionalism in contrast to all these British intergovernmentalists in this group. I may be attacked for labeling individual people now (you're more that welcome to correct my mistakes) but I suppose Dohet is a federalist and Mårten L. a neofunctionalist. Me? Maybe a neofederalist? Now, there is something to discuss at least. :-) Kellstrup, Morten; 1992; "European Integration and Political Theory", Copenhagen, pp 31-44. Let me now try out your thoughts on a regional scale, ok? Kellstrup doesn't mention anything about this regional type of functionalism and that's what really caught my eye and made me interested. I wrote this part before the one above so don't be surprised of I ignore some of the theoretical framework I should have picked up from above. I have no preconceived opinions before working this out as I go along (just in case you wrongly would interpret anything I say as sarcastic or anything). Scania is situated in the New Europe of Horizontally Overlapping Authorities ("system-transforming functionalism"). Some laws are made by the regional parliament, that is those that can't be made on a lower level of government without something valuble getting lost (Economically, politically? What is this eigentlich according to the subsidiarity principle?). But then Scania doesn't want to take care of certain "big politics" tasks, such as defence and foreign policy. So... Denmark makes the laws for Scania concerning foreign policy and Sweden makes the laws for Scania concerning defense and we have the same currency and central bank as Northern Germany and laws of the North German Republic are regulating these things. Additionally, the Council of Europe makes our laws concerning human rights, for example. Etc. Who does what is regulated in both the Scanian constitution and the constitution of the partner authority in question. In the Swedish constitution, you'll read that the defense territory includes the Autonomous Territory of Scania (and is also the area for mandatory conscription) and in the Danish constitution, it's written that Denmark makes our foreign policy. All this is further recognized by several international institutions. [Scania itself then proabably consists of autonomous communities, cities and neighbourhoods entitled to arrange their own positions as they like and forming blocks as they like (including with political territories outside Scania). The smaller communities are probably direct democracies and the bigger ones semi-direct ones. *All* territorial borders are decided by the populations inhabiting the areas. Even democratically agreed upon enclaves are ok as long as the population think it's worth the trouble. Now, I'm drifting...] But additionally, let's say that Sweden also takes care of environmental concerns and Denmark of infrastructure. And one day, the Danish government decides to build a bridge between Helsingør and Helsingborg and the Swedish government forbids this (makes a law against it, I suppose) because it's environmentally harmful. And Denmark takes Sweden to court. Now, the first question pops up: which is the court? The soon almighty International Court of Justice? Doesn't have to be, right? Denmark and Sweden can have chosen the North European Court of Justice (not yet invented of course) to decide in these matters. Or the International Court of Global Environment. Or the Court for All Disputes Where the Participants Start with Consonants (CADWPSC). In short: the choice of court is arbitrary (but agreement on where to settle the conflicts has to be made beforehand of course). Ok, I see a vision here and a very appealing one. But: won't it be crazy with all these judicial disputes about who's in charge? Of course, the states might learn to live with each other and respect the domains of others just like in countries of insitutional division of power like eg the cohabitation (between government and president) in France 1986-88 worked though it was supposed to be really rough (and actually was in the beginning). The president of the USA and Congress have respect for each other's areas but they also clash together. Much time in the New Europe of Regional System-Transforming Functionalism might be devoted to judicial disputes. Won't the courts get politicized very quickly? And who wouldn't like to bribe a judge? Will we be electing judges to the North European Court of Justice? Who are we who elect them? Or maybe, who are _they_ who elect them?* I want to know because these people will possibly eventually decide whether there will be built a bridge between Helsingør and Helsingborg. Of course, this problem is introduced already in the federal model but is accentuated in the functional model. I understand that this can be said to be just the principles of international law applied to smaller communities. Then, one needs to consider why international law has not had a bigger success than it has had (well, I know you tend to point out when the results are underestimated by participants in this group). There is the question of how to sanction a party breaking his contracts. Will this be regulated by isolating participants etc? It's starting to look like the theory of anarchy and that is not so far-fetched. International law is law in the world anarchy (the "realistic theory", ok there's the interdependence school too...). Will it work for a much more fragmented world? Does it demand more of us, the populations? Some of the problem with functionalism vs *neofunctionalism* I think lies in that regional functionalism just finds a very good final model but it's a static model. It doesn't take into considerations political realities like how it works in practise getting there starting from today's world. What are the forces that can bring it about? Are the nation states enough interested in transferring powers to international institutions just like that (= letting go of power for the politicians) or are the clever spill-over effects from neofunctionalism needed (ok, a more "primitive" type of functional spill-over *is* part of the functionalistic theory - but not the other types of spill-over at all). To me, it's quite clear that neofunctionalism has given us a very fast integration for Europe (which I think give hopes for my regions) while functionalism has given us things like the Nordic council that is a very limited type of integration. I also need to add that *I* too (like I interpret how your model comes about) like static models because they're so lucid and they just give us the possibility to create a simple normative model. That's why I proposed myself as a neofederalist because I like to think at the goal. But sometimes I try to be more realist and look for the neofunctionalist model. We're getting a regionally elected parliament in Scania in 1999. At times, I'm told that it's not necessary. "The municipalities can form their own regional leagues. What do you need a regional parliament for?" Well, they *can* but the answer is more complicated and has to do with having a political arena for regional politics and not least: political spill-over. One has to think less static then. (Look again at the paragraph that starts with "[Scania itself...". Do you think all the autonomous communities, cities and neighbourhoods *will* organise themselves in the best possible way...?) In the depicted Scanian example, if the North European Court of Justice grants Sweden the right to stop the construction of the bridge and Denmark refuses to take notice, what can be done? On the other hand, what can be done today if Schleswig-Holstein refuses to follow a decision made by the German Surpreme Court? We expect and trust them not to. That's basically it. We can't (and don't want to) use military violence in the west today anymore. Are nation states (including federal states) today's solutions to the lack of faith we have in territories and their populations regulating their businesses among themselves with some threat of violence lieing (Jesus, how do you spell lie-ing!?) behind it all. In the nation states, there can be said to lie a conceiled threat of use of force even though it hardly can be used anymore in the western democracies. Or can it? By arresting the leaders who are breaking the law? It maybe doesn't need to be military violence that is today's way of sanctioning violations of intrastate "treaties". Violence of the police may be closer to today's ultimate threat (before the fines and all that). Enough there. I leave this half finished in thinking before any more input from you (if you're not out of breath now) or before a new round of thoughts from me on the subject. [*) It's simply the old issue of how to select judges. Hague, Harrop and Breslin lists four choices used in the world in "Comparative Government and Politics", 1992, p 281: 1. Popular election (some states in the USA) 2. Election by the assembly (some states in the USA; some Latin American countries) 3. Appointment by the executive (Britain, Supreme Cour Judges in the USA (subject to Senate approval) 4. Co-option by the judiciary (Italy, Turkey). They also lists advantages and disadvantages of the selection methods. The bottomline is that much judicial power is connected with many problems.] --- No, the regional model of system-transforming functionalism is not a federal model. It refuses to be bound by the hierarchical structure of federalism with its exclusive horizontal authorities and powers. Federalism introduces constitutional power sharing that the unitary state can't conceive of being such a primitive creation. You added the idea of horizontal power sharing which I find very interesting but I still have my doubts about its practicability. Further, most important for our initial discussion is whether nation state Europe or federal Europe is the best starting point to achieve it. For the nation states, I grant that functionalism is easier to reach from nation state Europe. It's international law. It's there to use. And in fact, EU federalism _disturbs_ it. But from a regional point of view, pragmatic functionalism doesn't mean much. The kind of true community autonomy that can be reached that way is very small. That Sweden can form one binding union with Norway concerning specific issues and another one with Denmark concerning others is not so important for the respective parts the countries consist of. Functionalism and federalism are especially interesting when truly communitarian political entities are discussed. I'd say that federalism in Europe can create the basic ground for regional system-transforming functionalism (RSTF) by releasing political powers, postitive circles and momenta (in short: spill-over (with the help of neofunctionalism)) that helps empowering the regions which then can lead to adjusting federalism (big adjustments, changing the system - more on that next) to give the choice of RSTF. With nation state Europe and functionalism, nothing happens for the regions and communities IMHO. History, I'd say, tells us that. Can federalism and RSTF co-exist? Consider the example of Switzerland. There is a central ("federal") level and a cantonal level with 23 cantons (which btw are of sizes somewhat close to my ideal commuting distance size). In Switzerland, the powers of the central level are defined and the cantons get the residual powers. To know some of what regulates the affairs between cantons, I quote my essay (chapter 5) on http://www.df.lth.se/~cml/fed-integr-dd.txt : "Separata allianser och traktat av politisk karaktär [mellan kantoner] är förbjudna av historiska skäl (inbördeskriget precis före första konstitutionen skrevs 1848). Fördrag (eller 'överenskommelser') gällande lagar, administration och rätt är däremot tillåtna. Sådana är oftast nödvändiga i en federation för att delstaterna ska kunna sköta den fortlöpande verksamheten enligt Codding (s 42). Överenskommelser mellan två kantoner som gäller utnyttjande av vattenkraft eller mellan flera för att stödja fattiga och invalidiserade är inte ovanliga i Schweiz, fortsätter han. Avtal mellan kanton och utomstatlig makt får bara gälla offentlig ekonomi och polisregleringar. Dessutom måste sådana avtal meddelas förbundsmakten som kan stoppa dem om de hotar federationen eller övriga kantoners rättigheter. Det finns inte många sådana avtal och de som finns verkar istället göra federationen ansvarigt enligt internationell lag." and: "I de flesta kantoner finns ett fördragsreferendum. Det används huvudsakligen för interkantonala uppgörelser. Det kan inskränkas till de fall där fördragen jämställs med lagar för kantonen. De kan vara obligatoriska eller fakultativa i olika kantoner." So, RSTF is unlawful today in Switzerland. The cantons can't create common institutions to which they can delegate their powers. But you can change this and make it legal *even in a federal state*. So the provinces can create an institution common for the French speaking cantons that takes care of linguistc questions and another one for the urban cantons that makes the decisions concerning typical urban political problems. All this can happen within a federal state. And then you even have a central level that can enforce the treaties with the threat of violence as the last resort. If you find that the characteristics of RSTF are nicer than the old federalism, you can gradually take powers from the central level and let the cantons form their own super cantons among themselves instead. Federalism and RSTF aren't mutually exclusive and transitions in between the two can happen. That I support a federal development of the EU doesn't mean that I exclude RSTF forever. I might want to support *that* development when I see that the regions have been enough empowered by the federal one to be able to demand other arrangements in a challenge. And I might want to wait until I see so much stability that I don't think the threat of violence is necessary for it to work. > > You may now attack my ideas of the ideal federalism as something you > > think I won't attain in the current EU either. What is most important to > > me is to play along with a change that I estimate as positive. I can't > > hope for improvements if I _start_ by saying "no" when something is > > happening. > > But that doesn't mean you have to say "yes" to everything, whether you > think it's good or not? Of course not, and I don't think that was > what you meant either, was it? No, only when I estimate it as positive. > You think that the EU has potential to > be a step on the way to the kind of federalism you want. So your > attitude to concrete proposals is determined on whether or not they > will lead in that direction. (I believe you are making a *huge* mistake > in endorsing EMU, since it seems to me like a step in the wrong > direction from your point of view. But I won't press you on that > right now.) My attitude to proposals for change is determined on > whether or not they are compatible with the kind of world I want. Hmm, interesting, that description of difference between our attitudes to proposals for change. But it's not absolutely clear to me still. And concerning the EMU, I suppose that you thinking me making a mistake endorsing it, comes from your idea of regional currencies. Still, since I have _no_ hope whatsoever to achieve this with the help of a repudiation of the EU, I settle for what advantages I might achieve from endorsement. (I don't even think I would like to see a regional currency stop anywhere near where I live since the world we live in isn't adapted to the fast, practical, cheap, round-the-clock (electronic?) currency exchanges that may be a possibility in the future and so they create borders.* That fact is observable (especially in my border region) and on the other hand, the economic arguments aren't very clear.) I hope we can handle this very general opinion about the EMU without getting into a longer debate. Because it's a bit connected to the rest. If I only argue the EU question from a regional point of view, it may wrongly give the impression that it all I care about. I like the perspective because it simplifies and cultivates the discussion because it is based on very observable absurdities around border zones where the contacts are limited for a number of reasons. There is a measurable problem in which you can study the development. Then of course, I *have* my personal interest in the question and I attach great importance to it. I think it's more that can be done easily to improve the situation for the regions of Europe than can be done to combat most other problems like eg unemplyment that demands more complicated solutions that often involves eg economic fine-tunings. *) I think Mårten Lindström open my eyes a bit further concerning this in an article in which he followed up to yours. He kind of gave me a vision of a Europe which works everywhere and over great distances in the same way I most of all wish the regions around Scania would work together, that is with no more artificial borders than we have in the nation states. He kind of extended my thoughts of having economic, political, social transactions unrestrained in my region to having the same economic, political, social climate in all of Europe. > I have said before that I am in favour of the idea of variable > geometry. I see this as a development towards the kind of Europe > (and world) I would like to see -- it chimes in quite well with my > idea of overlapping, non-exclusive institutions. If the EU moves > in that direction, I would reconsider my opposition -- but then > again, in such a Europe the question would not be whether you're > "in" or "out", but *what* you are in and out of. Now I suddenly get confused. Is this the same thing as the so scoffed at "Europe ā la carte"? Or "Europe ā la carte" only involved one power center whose co-operation project you could or could decide not to belong to? And my usual disclaimer is valid in this posting to. I explore some thoughts and sometimes get an uneasiness that I wouldn't know if I put arguments in order to come up with a positive view of the form European co-operation has today. All that jazz, you know... -- Malte Lewan Longa Onivarsiteid, Scania, EO Tengtcen ølle redgijonal! cml@df.lth.se http://www.df.lth.se/~cml Always think regionally! 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